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The Importance of Inferior Voting Rights  
in Dual-Class Firms 
Dov Solomon* 
Over the past several years, corporate law scholarship has carefully 
analyzed the effects of dual-class capital structures, which allocate 
superior voting rights to insiders and inferior voting rights to public 
shareholders. This Article adds to the literature by focusing on a unique 
and novel type of dual-class structure—one in which the public shares 
have no voting rights at all. It notes that this structure is fundamentally 
different because in the absence of even highly diluted voting rights in 
public hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure 
rules and corporate governance standards. Nonvoting shareholders are 
deprived of these significant components of investor protection. 
After carefully identifying the serious consequences of nonvoting 
common stock for investor protection, the Article suggests two ways to 
address them. First, the Securities and Exchange Commission should act 
to protect nonvoting shareholders by requiring the same level of disclosure 
when nonvoting stock is issued as is required when voting stock is issued. 
Towards implementing this proposal, the Article distinguishes between 
the situation of no voting rights and the long-standing federal court 
decision asserting that the regulation of voting rights is beyond the 
delegated authority of the Commission. Second, stock exchange rules 
should impose requirements for listed firms aimed at protecting holders of 
nonvoting stock. These rules would grant nonvoting shareholders certain 
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disclosure and governance rights they do not otherwise have under federal 
or state law. The Article’s proposals directly address the implications of 
nonvoting stock for disclosure and corporate governance, and therefore are 
preferable to the current incidental reaction of major index providers to 
dual-class capital structures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Snap Inc., Silicon Valley’s social-media star, is a 
groundbreaking company that is reinventing the camera.1 In March 
2017, it proved its ability to innovate in the financial field as well 
 
 1. Snap states on its website that “[w]e believe that reinventing the camera represents 
our greatest opportunity to improve the way people live and communicate.” SNAP INC., 
https://www.snap.com/en-US/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
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when it went public with a unique dual-class capital structure.2 In 
contrast to other companies that have also issued dual-class shares, 
such as Google or Facebook, the public float in Snap’s initial public 
offering (IPO) had no voting rights at all. The issuance of nonvoting 
common stock has serious implications for corporate governance 
and investor protection that go far beyond those of the traditional 
dual-class structures.3 
A dual-class capital structure creates a gap between voting 
rights and cash-flow rights.4 A company founder who wants to 
raise capital without relinquishing effective control of the company 
can issue different classes of shares with unequal voting rights. 
While her shares enjoy superior voting rights, the shares issued to 
the public investors grant either inferior voting rights or no voting 
rights at all. By issuing two or more classes of shares with unequal 
voting rights, the founder can avoid the dilution that an IPO 
normally creates and hold on to most of the voting rights in 
shareholder meetings, despite her relatively low equity investment. 
In this way, she can entrench her control of the company even after 
it goes public. 
There are two main incentives for going public with a dual-class 
capital structure: first, it allows the company’s founder to pursue 
her idiosyncratic vision for producing above-market returns; 
second, it insulates management from short-term market pressures 
and thus promotes long-termism.5 However, the controller of a 
 
 2. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Snap’s I.P.O., Evidence of Bankers’ Strategy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/business/dealbook/in-snaps-ipo-
evidence-of-bankers-strategy.html. 
 3. Following Snap’s IPO, Kurt Schacht, the Chairman of the SEC’s Investor Advisory 
Committee, referred to the possibility that the issuance of nonvoting common stock will be 
the new trend with unicorn companies as a “troubling development from the perspective of 
investor protection and corporate governance.” See Therese Poletti, Potential Snap IPO Effect: 
More Unicorns to Wall Street, but with Horrible Terms, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/potential-snap-ipo-effect-more-unicorns-to-wall-
street-but-with-horrible-terms-2017-03-02. 
 4. Stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures are alternative ways to create a 
gap between voting rights and cash-flow rights. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman 
& George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms 
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). 
 5. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Cofounders, Google, 2004 
Founders’ IPO Letter: “An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, 
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2019) 
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dual-class firm has two fundamental characteristics that result in 
agency problems: weak ownership incentives and entrenchment.6 
The combination of these characteristics produces situations where 
a controller might have interests that substantially diverge from 
those of public shareholders, and no threat of replacement exists to 
prevent her from pursuing these interests. This may lead to a 
distortion of various business choices, such as the extraction of 
private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders. 
Moreover, since the controller can extract private benefits from 
capital that is inside the firm, while she bears only a fraction of the 
costs of deploying the capital in the firm rather than using it more 
efficiently elsewhere in the economy, her incentives may become 
distorted when considering whether the firm should expand, 
contract, or remain the same size. 
Furthermore, agency problems in dual-class firms are 
substantially exacerbated when public shareholders are not entitled 
to voting rights. In the absence of even highly diluted voting rights 
in public hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of 
disclosure rules and corporate governance standards. For example, 
if a company has registered only nonvoting shares, it is not required 
to distribute a proxy or information statement under federal 
securities law.7 Moreover, holders of nonvoting stock are unable to 
express their voice on a company’s key issues and raise shareholder 
proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8 
On the other hand, so long as shareholders have voting rights, even 
inferior ones, they are protected by certain disclosure and 
governance requirements for listed firms. From the perspective of 
investor protection, therefore, there are significant differences 
between issuing nonvoting and low-voting common stock. 
 
[https://perma.cc/5YQK-LMHP] (“We are creating a corporate structure that is designed 
for stability over long time horizons. By investing in Google, you are placing an unusual long 
term bet on the team, especially Sergey and me, and on our innovative approach.”). For a 
detailed discussion of these incentives, see infra Part III. 
 6. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 1453, 1465–66 (2019). 
 7. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (2018) (requiring the distribution of an information 
statement to every shareholder “of the class that is entitled to vote” on a  
shareholder meeting). 
 8. See id. § 240.14a-8 (2018) (requiring a shareholder to hold at least $2,000 in market 
value, or one percent, of the company’s “securities entitled to be voted” in order to be eligible 
to submit a proposal for inclusion in a proxy statement). 
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It should be noted that passive investors, such as index funds, 
are forced to invest in nonvoting common shares despite their 
effects on investor protection.9 Therefore, major index providers 
have recently revised their policies regarding multiclass shares and 
moved to exclude the stock of dual-class firms from stock indices.10 
The exclusion of the stock of some of the most-innovative 
companies, however, would prevent the indices from being as 
expansive and diverse as the underlying industries and economies 
whose performance they seek to capture. The indices then may no 
longer reflect the investable universe of public companies or 
represent the wealth-creating power of the U.S. economy. As a 
result, the access to the investment marketplace of Main Street 
investors, who often own stock in U.S. public companies through 
an index, would become limited. 
Therefore, the Article suggests two different ways to address 
the consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure and 
corporate governance, which are not limited to the indices’ 
inclusion policy, but reflect a broader perspective of the issue. 
Instead of addressing these consequences incidentally by means of 
the index providers, and thus creating a gap between the indices 
and the economy, they should be directly addressed through 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and stock 
exchange rules. 
First, the case of nonvoting stock should be distinguished from 
the case of low-voting stock, the latter of which was the subject of 
the Business Roundtable decision in 1990.11 This long-standing 
federal court decision asserted that regulating voting rights, which 
traditionally have been the exclusive province of state corporate 
law, is beyond the authority of the SEC.12 When public shareholders 
have no voting rights at all, however, there are direct negative 
 
 9. Index funds buy and hold stock in an underlying index, such as the S&P 500, and 
they consequently own certain shares irrespective of their performance and prospects. 
 10. See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION—NEXT  
STEPS 3 (2017), http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_ 
Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [hereinafter FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL]; S&P Dow Jones Indices 




 11. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 12. Id. 
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implications for investor protection, which is indisputably subject 
to the SEC’s delegated authority under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.13 Therefore, the SEC can and should act to protect 
nonvoting shareholders by requiring the same level of disclosure 
when nonvoting stock is issued as is required when voting  
stock is issued. 
Second, stock exchanges should impose requirements for listed 
firms aimed at protecting holders of nonvoting stock. Since the 
exchanges have strong incentives to maintain good reputations, the 
concern that the competition to attract new listings may put “race 
to the bottom” pressure on listing standards is not reasonable. 
Indeed, stock exchange rules grant nonvoting shareholders  
certain disclosure and governance rights they do not otherwise 
have under federal or state law. The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) rules, for instance, require that any materials sent to voting 
shareholders, including proxy material, also be sent to nonvoting 
shareholders.14 However, these rules are limited in protecting 
nonvoting shareholders.15 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the rise of 
dual-class capital structures in general and the issuance of 
nonvoting common stock in particular. Part III analyzes the 
incentives a company’s founder has to use dual-class shares—to 
pursue her idiosyncratic vision and promote long-termism—and 
sheds light on their limits in justifying dual-class structures. Part IV 
analyzes the agency problems that characterize dual-class 
structures, followed by a presentation of empirical evidence for 
their costs. Part V focuses on dual-class structures in which the 
common shares have no voting rights at all. It reveals the negative 
effects of the absence of even highly diluted voting rights on 
investor protection. Therefore, Part VI suggests addressing the 
serious consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure 
 
 13. Protecting investors is one of the three key statutory mandates of the SEC. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
 14. See Voting Rights, NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(B)(2) (2019), 
https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-
filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--
WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-99 [hereinafter NYSE Listed Company Manual] (“[H]olders of 
any listed non-voting common stock must receive all communications, including proxy 
material, sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of the listed company.”). 
 15. See infra Section VI.C. 
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and corporate governance through SEC regulation and stock 
exchange rules. It also explains the priority of these two proposals 
over the alternative of excluding nonvoting stock from market 
indices. Finally, Part VII concludes the discussion. 
II. THE RISE OF DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
Nonvoting shares are not newcomers. In the early twentieth 
century, dual-class capital structures that included nonvoting 
shares gained in popularity in the United States.16 However, under 
public pressure in response to the listing of nonvoting common 
stock by the Dodge Brothers Company, in 1926 the NYSE began to 
pay more attention to shareholder voting rights when reviewing 
listing applications.17 Finally, the NYSE formally announced a flat 
rule against listing nonvoting common stock in 1940.18 
In contrast to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the 
Nasdaq stock exchange (Nasdaq), which permitted dual-class share 
structures, the NYSE retained its “one-share, one-vote” listing 
standard for almost six decades. Over time, however, companies 
have recognized the potential power of dual-class stock schemes as 
a defense against hostile takeover bids. An increasing pressure 
from these companies and the competition from other U.S. 
exchanges led the NYSE to impose a four-year moratorium on this 
standard in the mid-1980s.19 Despite a later proposal for the SEC to 
relax existing restrictions on listings of dual-class stock,20 the SEC 
rejected the NYSE’s proposal in 1988 and instead promulgated Rule 
19c-4, which barred national securities exchanges from listing 
shares of issuers that nullified, reduced or restricted voting rights 
of existing public stockholders.21 In 1990, Rule 19c-4 was challenged 
in federal court on the ground that the SEC had exceeded its 
 
 16. Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 891–92 
(1994); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 565, 568–69 (1991). 
 17. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 569; Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder 
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687,  
697 (1985). 
 18. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 569; Seligman, supra note 17, at 699. 
 19. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 577. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 
(July 12, 1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c–4 (2018)). 
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rulemaking authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22 
In the Business Roundtable decision, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals ultimately struck down the new rule as being a matter 
for state corporate law and beyond the SEC’s delegated authority.23 
Despite the Business Roundtable decision, the SEC succeeded in 
persuading the main stock exchanges to adopt a policy similar to 
the former Rule 19c-4 in their listing standards. Although both the 
NYSE’s and Nasdaq’s policies generally granted companies wide 
latitude in structuring disparate voting rights for multiple classes 
of common stock at the time of an IPO, they set limitations on 
subsequent actions that reduce or restrict voting rights of existing 
public stockholders.24 Therefore, while U.S.-listed companies face 
constraints on a dual-class recapitalization, they have been largely 
free to go public with a dual-class capital structure. 
More than 13.5% of the 133 companies listing shares on U.S. 
exchanges in 2015 have set up a dual-class structure, compared 
with 12% in 2014, and just 1% in 2005.25 The trend of multiple-share 
classes gained steam in 2004 when Google decided to go public 
with a dual-class capital structure, granting its cofounders, 
executive management team, and directors 61.4% of the voting 
power.26 In the years since, the multiclass capital structure has 
become the norm in Silicon Valley among many hi-tech 
companies.27 It has enabled the founders of companies that have 
gone public such as Google, Facebook, Zynga, Groupon, LinkedIn 
and Yelp to hold the majority of voting rights and entrench their 
control of the company by issuing special classes of shares that give 
 
 22. For the statutory mandates of the SEC, see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
 23. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 24. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(A)–(B); Voting Rules, 
Nasdaq Stock Market Listing Rules § 5640 (2019), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com
/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_3_8_31&manual=%2Fnas
daq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F [hereinafter Nasdaq Listing Rules]. 
 25. Kristin Lin, The Big Number, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:41 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-number-1439865699. 
 26. See Page & Brin, supra note 5. 
 27. Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Stock Grip Becomes New Normal in Silicon Valley, 
BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2012, 10:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-
05-07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-becomes-new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech. Lise Buyer, 
principal at Class V Group in Portola Valley, California, stated that “[i]t may be everybody 
tries [a dual-class structure], because the market seems to be giving everyone a pass.” Id. 
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them more votes than the holders of other classes of shares.28 These 
technology companies followed in the footsteps of veteran media 
corporations like the New York Times, News Corp., and Viacom, 
which had adopted the multiple-class share model for their IPOs.29 
The trend of listing dual-class shares on U.S. stock exchanges is 
not limited to U.S. companies. Since the United Kingdom and Hong 
Kong prohibited the use of dual-class stock,30 some foreign 
companies have chosen to list their dual-class shares on U.S. 
exchanges. For example, in 2012, Manchester United, the famous 
English soccer club, preferred to list its shares on the NYSE rather 
than the London Stock Exchange due to the option of using a dual-
class capital structure.31 Similarly, in 2014, Alibaba, the Chinese e-
commerce giant, went public on the NYSE rather than the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in order to use a dual-class structure.32 
In contrast to IPOs in which the public float had at least some 
voting rights, Snap’s IPO in March 2017 appears to be the first 
nonvoting listing IPO on a U.S. exchange since the NYSE in 1940 
generally barred multiclass common stock structures with unequal 
voting rights.33 Following its IPO, Snap has a three-tiered capital 
 
 28. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares. 
 29. It was argued that “insulation from the vagaries of the” capital market could help 
protect a news outlet’s editorial independence. See Green & Levy, supra note 27. 
 30. See H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., Concept Paper: Weighted Voting Rights, at 25–28 
(Hong Kong), III-12 to III-13 (UK) (Aug. 2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-
Market/News/Market-Consultations/2011-to-2015/August-2014-Weighted-Voting-
Rights/Consultation-paper/cp2014082.pdf. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has recently 
revised its rules regarding dual-class shares. See Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Adds Dual-
Class Shares, Paving Way for Tech Titans, BLOOMBERG (April 24, 2018, 4:38 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-24/hong-kong-approves-dual-class-
shares-paving-way-for-tech-titans. 
 31. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Manchester United’s I.P.O., a Preference for American 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012
/07/10/in-manchester-uniteds-i-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules. 
 32. See Shen Wei & Angus Young, Dual Share Plan in Context: Making Sense of Hong 
Kong’s Decision Not to Embrace Alibaba’s Listing, 26 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 4 (2015). 
 33. Indeed, since their dual-class IPOs, Google and Under Armour also listed 
nonvoting shares that were issued to existing public shareholders in a stock split, while 
Facebook attempted to do the same but gave up the midstream issuance of nonvoting shares 
following shareholder litigation. Yet, public shareholders of Google and Under Armour, in 
contrast to Snap, received at the IPOs at least some voting rights. See Google Inc., Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 56–87 (May 9, 2012); Under Armour Inc., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5–35 (July 13, 2015); Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(Sep. 21, 2017); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly  
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structure. The founders, Evan Spiegel and Bobby Murphy, hold 
Class C shares and are entitled to ten votes per share on matters 
submitted to Snap’s shareholders for approval. Pre-IPO VC 
investors and other insiders hold Class B shares and are entitled to 
one vote per share. Public investors hold Class A shares and are 
entitled to no vote. Following the IPO, the founders can exercise 
voting rights with respect to their Class C common stock, which 
represents approximately 88.5% of the voting power of Snap’s 
outstanding capital stock.34 
Snap’s unique dual-class capital structure with its nonvoting 
common stock has serious implications for investor protection that 
need to be understood and addressed. To achieve these goals, the 
next two Parts of the Article will discuss and analyze the pros and 
cons of dual-class structures in general and then the following Parts 
will discuss dual-class structures in which the common shares have 
no voting rights at all. 
III. INCENTIVES FOR DUAL-CLASS STRUCTURES 
Founders articulate two main reasons for going public with a 
dual-class structure. The first is that it enables them to pursue their 
idiosyncratic vision for the company. The second is that it insulates 
management from short-term market pressures, allowing 
management to make decisions that enhance long-term value.35 
This Part analyzes these incentives and sheds light on their limits 
in justifying dual-class structures. 
A. The Founder’s Idiosyncratic Vision 
A dual-class structure enables a company’s founder to hold the 
majority of voting rights and entrench her control of the company 
even after it goes public. It is argued that uncontestable and 
indefinite control allows a talented founder to implement her 
 
to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/ 
dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.html. 
 34. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1/A) 4 (Feb. 24, 
2017) [hereinafter Snap Prospectus]. 
 35. See, e.g., Page & Brin, supra note 5. 
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idiosyncratic vision,36 which may produce above-market returns, 
benefiting not only the founder but also the investors.37 Therefore, 
the allocation of superior voting rights to the founder and inferior 
voting rights, or even no voting rights at all, to the investors is 
value-enhancing and thus justified. 
This argument assumes that (a) founders have superior 
business skills and knowledge relative to other shareholders, and 
(b) they utilize their superior skills and knowledge to benefit all 
shareholders. However, neither of these assumptions is always or 
necessarily correct. 
Given the specific risk of investing in a single company, 
shareholders often diversify their capital market investments.38 A 
byproduct of their investments across many corporations is that 
they accumulate professional knowledge and enhance their 
expertise. Shareholder meetings in different corporations often deal 
with similar issues, such as corporate governance and executive 
compensation. Thus, shareholders—particularly institutional 
investors—acquire knowledge, experience, and expertise through 
their investments in many corporations.39 Therefore, at least with 
regard to matters that are frequently debated at shareholder 
meetings, founders do not necessarily wield superior knowledge or 
expertise as compared to other shareholders.40 
Even if we were to accept the assumption that founders of dual-
class firms have superior business skills and knowledge, there is no 
guarantee that these advantages will be applied in a way that will 
maximize the aggregate shareholder wealth. Quite the contrary: a 
founder might exploit her advantages to advance courses of action 
that serve her private interests but conflict with the interests of 
public investors. For example, she might extract private benefits of 
 
 36. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 
YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (“[C]ontrol allows entrepreneurs to pursue business strategies that 
they believe will produce above-market returns by securing the ability to implement their 
vision in the manner they see fit.”). 
 37. Id. at 590. 
 38. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196–98 (10th 
ed. 2011). 
 39. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 852–53 (1992). 
 40. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 881 (2005). 
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control at the expense of other shareholders.41 Since we cannot 
assume that a founder necessarily utilizes her superior skills and 
knowledge to benefit all shareholders, the “founder’s idiosyncratic 
vision” argument loses its justification. 
B. Long-Termism 
Another argument often used to justify dual-class structures is 
that they insulate management from short-term market pressures 
and thus promote long-termism.42 A commonly held view is that 
corporate law should not promote short-termism but should rather 
strive to support long-term shareholder value.43 For example, two 
prominent judges on the Delaware Supreme Court have expressed 
concern about the consequences of investors’ short-termism and 
urged managers to promote the long-term interests of investors.44 
With a lock on control, dual-class structures promote long-termism. 
They protect the founder from the risk of being ousted due to her 
short-term performance and thus release her from concern about 
 
 41. See infra Section IV.A. 
 42. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 
103 VA. L. REV. 585, 611–12 (2017); George W. Dent, Jr., Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to 
Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 748 (1986). For empirical evidence supporting 
this argument, see Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim & Mark H. Liu, Growth Opportunities, 
Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. CORP. FIN. 304 (2016) (finding 
that dual-class firms face lower short-term market pressure than single-class firms). 
 43. Hansmann & Kraakman state decisively that “[t]here is no longer any serious 
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term 
shareholder value.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001); see also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate 
Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. 
L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1994) (“[T]he raison d’être of large publicly held corporations is to 
maximize ‘longterm shareholder’ and corporate value.” (footnote omitted)); Michael E. 
Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 65, 79 (“[L]ong-term shareholder value should be identified as the explicit 
corporate goal.”). 
 44. Jack B. Jacobs, Lecture, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive 
It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1649–50 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate 
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their 
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 17–18 (2010). But see 
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1557 
(2015) (arguing that managers serving long-term shareholders may well destroy more 
economic value than managers serving short-term shareholders; thus, favoring the interests 
of long-term shareholders could reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm 
over time). 
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short-term market pressures.45 Rather, the founder can focus on the 
company’s results in the long run and make decisions that enhance 
long-term value.46 
However, the assumption that investors push managers into 
adopting myopic policy aimed at reaping quick profits in the short 
term, even if it causes harm to the company in the long run, is not 
empirically supported. The biggest investors in the capital markets 
that own a vast majority of the shares of public companies are 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies 
and mutual funds.47 They are characterized by a long-term 
investment horizon, which allows them to meet their long-term 
obligations.48 Empirical studies have shown that institutional 
ownership is associated with higher long-term investment.49 Sunil 
Wahal and John McConnell surveyed 2500 companies and found a 
strong correlation between institutional share ownership and 
expenditures for property, plant, equipment, and research and 
development (R&D).50 Similarly, Gary Hansen and Charles Hill 
analyzed data from 129 companies and found a positive correlation 
between institutional ownership and R&D expenditure.51 These 
findings refute the premise that investors suffer from myopia. 
Instead, what emerges is that institutional investors seek long-term 
 
 45. The economic and legal literature discusses critical problems created by short-term 
interests of shareholders. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and 
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267–71 (2012); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good 
Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-
are-shareholders [https://perma.cc/M6CB-E66Q]. 
 46. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Cofounders, Google, 2011 
Founders’ Letter (Apr. 2012) https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2011/ (“In our 
experience, success is more likely if you concentrate on the long term. Technology products 
often require significant investment over many years to fulfill their potential . . . . We have 
protected Google from outside pressures and the temptation to sacrifice future opportunities 
to meet short-term demands . . . . We have a structure that prevents outside parties from 
taking over or unduly influencing our management decisions.”). 
 47. For the important role played by institutional investors in the capital markets 
around the world, see Dov Solomon, The Voice: The Minority Shareholder’s Perspective, 17 NEV. 
L.J. 739, 750–51 (2017). 
 48. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, 564 (2006). 
 49. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 
BUS. LAW. 977, 993–96 (2013). 
 50. Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial 
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 310 (2000). 
 51. Gary S. Hansen & Charles W. L. Hill, Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-
Series Study of Four Technology-Driven Industries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 6, 9 (1991). 
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economic results from the companies they invest in.52 In light of 
these findings, there is no essential need to insulate management 
from short-term market pressures. 
Furthermore, even if we were to accept that investors push 
management into adopting short-term policy, there is no clear 
evidence to suggest that dual-class structure is the solution for this 
myopia. We cannot assume that dual-class firms focus on the long 
term, and thus invest more for the long run. Onur Arugaslan, 
Douglas Cook and Robert Kieschnick examined data on U.S. IPOs 
from 1980 through 2008 and found that post-IPO dual-class firms 
do not invest in R&D more than single-class firms.53 Moreover, 
Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste examined a 
matched sample of 504 U.S. dual-class firms and 504 U.S. single-
class firms that had an IPO from 1980 to 2015 and documented that 
dual-class firms tend to invest in R&D less than single-class firms.54 
Therefore, the “long-termism” argument for dual-class structures 
also loses its justification. 
IV. AGENCY PROBLEMS IN DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
The controller of a dual-class firm has two fundamental 
characteristics that result in agency problems: weak ownership 
incentives and entrenchment.55 A controller with low equity 
holdings bears only a small fraction of the negative effects of her 
actions on the firm value while capturing the full private benefits 
of control, and thus her incentives may be distorted.56 The smaller 
the controller’s equity stake in the dual-class firm, the greater the 
severity of the incentive distortions. At the same time, 
entrenchment insulates the controller from the disciplinary force of 
 
 52. See Black, supra note 39, at 862–64. 
 53. Onur Arugaslan, Douglas O. Cook & Robert Kieschnick, On the Decision to Go 
Public with Dual Class Stock, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 170, 171 (2010). 
 54. Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firm 
Valuation (European Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin., Working Paper No. 550, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062895. But see Jordan, Kim & Liu, supra note 42, at 305 
(analyzing data from 1994 to 2011 and finding that dual-class firms have higher R&D 
intensity than single-class firms). 
 55. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6. 
 56. Solomon, supra note 47, at 746 (explaining and demonstrating how a disparity 
between voting rights and cash-flow rights exacerbates conflicts of interest between  
majority and minority shareholders and encourages the controller to act against the public 
investors’ interests). 
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the market for corporate control that otherwise might limit the 
ability of a poorly performing controller—whether due to agency 
problems or otherwise—to continue leading the firm.57 Indeed, the 
controller of a dual-class firm is able to entrench control while her 
incentives may become misaligned with the preferences of public 
investors. It should be stressed that it is the combination of weak 
ownership incentives and entrenchment, which characterizes dual-
class firms, that produces these serious agency problems.  
The combination of weak ownership incentives and 
entrenchment sets dual-class firms apart from single-class widely 
held or controlled firms. With low equity holdings but no 
entrenchment, as in widely held firms, the extent to which a single-
class firm can underperform or run in ways departing from the 
interests of public investors is limited by the market for corporate 
control.58 In a single-class controlled firm, conversely, while an 
entrenched controller with high equity holdings cannot be replaced 
and thus disciplined by the market for corporate control, she may 
be incentivized to maximize the firm’s value by holding a majority 
of the cash-flow rights affected by her actions.59 In contrast to these 
two types of single-class firms, the absence of both strong financial 
incentives and market discipline in dual-class firms produces a 
situation where a controller might have interests that substantially 
diverge from those of public investors, and no threat of 
replacement exists to prevent her from pursuing these interests.  
The negative effects of the combination of weak ownership 
incentives and entrenchment will be discussed in the next section, 
followed by a presentation of empirical evidence for these effects. 
A. Extraction of Private Benefits 
The aforementioned combination of weak ownership 
incentives and entrenchment may lead to a distortion of various 
business choices. Because a controller of a dual-class firm takes into 
account the effects of her decisions not only on the firm value but 
also on her level of private benefits, she may favor choices that 
 
 57. For the importance of the market for corporate control as a disciplinary mechanism 
for lowering agency costs, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
 58. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42, at 603. 
 59. Id. 
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increase her private benefits of control even if those choices are not 
optimal from the perspective of maximizing the firm value. The 
discussion below will illustrate some situations of distorted choices 
in which controllers extract private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders, a practice known as “tunneling.”60 
Let us take, for example, a dual-class firm in which the 
controlling shareholder holds the majority of voting rights but only 
ten percent of the cash-flow rights. For every dollar that the 
company produces in profits and distributes as dividends to the 
shareholders, the controller will receive only ten cents, while ninety 
cents will be divided up amongst the other shareholders. The 
controlling shareholder is thus likely to use her control of the 
company to pass decisions that will increase her private benefits at 
the expense of minority shareholders: for instance, to engage in 
inefficient self-dealing transactions between the company and an 
entity affiliated with the controller on terms that favor the entity 
and thus, in turn, the controller.61 Consider, for example, a 
transaction in which the company sells an asset to an entity 
controlled by the controller, which results in a loss of one hundred 
dollars to the company, but a profit of forty dollars to the buyer 
entity. This transaction would be in the interest of the controller 
because the controller makes forty dollars profit but bears a loss of 
only ten dollars (ten percent of the loss of one hundred dollars to 
the company). In fact, because of the controller’s distorted choices, 
any private benefit of control larger than ten dollars creates an 
incentive to carry out this self-dealing transaction, despite its being 
undesirable from the perspective of the company and inefficient for 
the overall economy. 
A second kind of distorted choice also stems from weak 
ownership incentives and entrenchment: usurping an opportunity 
that would be more valuable in the hands of the company rather 
 
 60. Extraction of private benefits of control is commonly referred to as “tunneling.” 
See, e.g., Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2011) (using the term 
“tunneling” to describe the extraction of wealth from firms by insiders, i.e., managers and 
controlling shareholders); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000) 
(using the term “tunneling” to describe the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of those who control them). 
 61. See In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 
2016 WL 301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“As control rights diverge from equity 
ownership, the controller has heightened incentives to engage in related-party transactions 
and cause the corporation to make other forms of non-pro rata transfers.”). 
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than the controller. For example, assume that the company has the 
right to an opportunity which will result in a profit of one hundred 
dollars to the company but which the controller can take from the 
company for the controller’s private benefit, resulting in a profit of 
forty dollars to the controller. If the controller takes the 
opportunity, she will benefit by forty dollars, but bear only ten 
dollars of the foregone benefit to the company (ten percent of one 
hundred). Therefore, the controller has an incentive to take this 
opportunity, even though it is undesirable from the point of view 
of the company as well as inefficient for the overall economy. Here 
again, because of distorted choices, any private benefit of  
control larger than ten dollars will create an incentive to usurp such 
an opportunity. 
A third kind of distorted choice involves the appointment or 
retention of the controller or her family member as an executive 
rather than a better outside candidate. Suppose that choosing an 
incompetent family member as an executive, rather than the best 
person available outside the family, would result in a private 
benefit of control of forty dollars from having the family member 
serve, but produce a loss of one hundred dollars to the company. 
However, the controller bears a loss of only ten dollars (ten percent 
of one hundred dollars) and thus has an incentive to appoint the 
family member rather than the better candidate. Moreover, the 
controller might choose to retain her family member as an executive 
even if the family member underperforms and would be replaced 
but for her relationship with the controller. In fact, any private 
benefit larger than ten dollars creates an incentive for the 
appointment and retention of the controller or her family member 
as an executive, even though it is undesirable from the perspective 
of the company and inefficient for the overall economy. 
The analysis of agency problems and incentive distortions in 
dual-class firms has so far proceeded on the assumption that the 
firm has a given amount of capital, with the relevant question being 
how the firm manages that capital. However, agency problems  
also arise when the size of the pie changes. Therefore, the  
following discussion points to a different set of distorted choices 
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concerning whether the firm should expand, contract, or remain the 
same size.62 
It should be noted that the considerations of whether to raise 
additional capital are separate from the question of whether the 
company currently is using its existing capital efficiently. A 
company may effectively deploy its existing capital, but may not 
have additional opportunities for profitable investments, and 
should therefore not expand. Moreover, even if a company has 
operated profitably in the past, there is always a question whether, 
going forward, it will be able to deploy its existing capital more 
efficiently than that capital could be deployed elsewhere in the 
economy. If the answer to this question is negative, then the 
company should not remain at its current size but contract by 
returning capital to its investors. 
From the point of view of public investors and of society in 
general, it is desirable that a company should raise more capital 
only if it can deploy that capital efficiently, which is not always the 
case. If the company cannot use the additional capital efficiently, 
then it is not desirable for it to expand. However, in the context of 
a dual-class firm, a controller has a substantial structural bias in 
favor of expanding more than is desirable, as well as a strong 
structural incentive to avoid contracting, even when contraction is 
desirable. Because the controller can extract private benefits from 
capital that is inside the firm while bearing only a fraction of the 
costs of deploying the capital in the firm rather than elsewhere in 
the economy, her incentives become distorted when considering 
whether the firm should expand, contract, or remain the same size.  
This section demonstrates a wide range of distorted choices 
aimed at increasing private benefits of control at the expense of 
minority shareholders. The distortion of various choices results 
from the combination of weak ownership incentives and 
entrenchment, which characterizes dual-class firms. The next 
section will discuss the empirical evidence on the negative effects 
of dual-class structures. 
 
 62. See generally, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure 
and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (John 
J. McCall ed., 1982) (analyzing agency problems of expansion and management’s tendency 
to avoid distributing cash or assets to shareholders). 
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B. Empirical Evidence 
The majority of the empirical findings support the above 
analysis of agency problems in dual-class firms. Studies around the 
world have shown that the combination of weak ownership 
incentives and entrenchment distorts controller incentives, 
increases extraction of private benefits of control, and thus 
decreases firm value. Some studies have compared the effect of 
dual-class shares on firm value to the effect of other mechanisms of 
separating cash-flow rights and control rights. For example, Stijn 
Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan and Larry Lang studied 
1301 companies from eight East Asian economies to examine the 
impact of dual-class shares, pyramid structures and cross-holdings 
among firms on firm value.63 They found that firm value increases 
with the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, but decreases 
when the voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights.64 Additionally, 
the value discount generally increases with the size of the wedge 
between voting and cash-flow rights.65 Morten Bennedsen and 
Kasper Meisner Nielsen used a sample of 4096 companies from 
fourteen European countries, and found that companies with a 
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights have lower firm 
values and that dual-class shares are associated with a significantly 
larger value discount than pyramid structures.66 Belen Villalonga 
and Raphael Amit used a sample of 515 companies from the United 
States and found that dual-class shares have a negative impact on 
firm value, while pyramids have the opposite effect.67 
Other studies have focused specifically on dual-class structure 
among the mechanisms for separating cash-flow rights and control 
rights and have shown its negative effects. Research published by 
IRRC and ISS found that dual-class firms have worse economic 
results in the long term as compared to companies with a one-
 
 63. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2742–
43 (2002). 
 64. Id. at 2743–44. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in 
European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212, 2212–13 (2010). 
 67. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 3047, 3049 (2009). 
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share-one-vote structure.68 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew 
Metrick analyzed a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the 
United States and found evidence that firm value is positively 
associated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively associated 
with insiders’ voting rights.69 Moreover, they found that the larger 
the wedge between the controller’s voting rights and cash-flow 
rights, the greater the reduction in the firm value.70 Ronald Masulis, 
Cong Wang and Fei Xie used the same sample as Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick and examined how the divergence between insider 
voting and cash-flow rights in dual-class firms affects the extraction 
of private benefits of control.71 They found “that as this divergence 
widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside 
shareholders, CEOs receive higher [levels of] compensation,” 
insiders are more likely to make shareholder value-destroying 
acquisitions, “and capital expenditures contribute less to 
shareholder value.”72 These findings support the agency 
hypothesis that insiders with excess voting rights over cash-flow 
rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at the expense of 
outside shareholders. These findings also explain why firm value 
decreases as insiders control more voting rights relative to cash-
flow rights. 
Moreover, studies have shown that the unification of dual-class 
shares into a single-share class increases firm value. Ingolf 
Dittmann and Niels Ulbricht analyzed the decisions of thirty-two 
German dual-class firms to consolidate their share structure from 
dual to single-class equity between 1990 and 2001.73 They found a 
significant positive effect of the announcement of a stock 
unification on a firm’s value.74 Scott Smart, Ramabhadran 
Thirumalai and Chad Zutter studied thirty-seven dual-class firms 
 
 68. INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST. & INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERV., 
CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND 
RISK REVIEW 8 (2012). 
 69. Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of 
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1054 (2010). 
 70. Id. at 1084. 
 71. Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class 
Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1700 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 1698–99. 
 73. Ingolf Dittmann & Niels Ulbricht, Timing and Wealth Effects of German Dual Class 
Stock Unifications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 163, 164 (2007). 
 74.  Id. 
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that unified their share classes during the five years following their 
IPOs and found a significantly positive stock price reaction to 
unification announcements.75 Beni Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste 
studied 121 voluntary dual-class share unifications in Europe from 
1996 through 2009 and found that unification significantly 
increases firms’ long-term market value.76 These findings suggest 
that unifications per se are beneficial to public shareholders, most 
probably because of the corporate governance improvements 
accompanying them. 
However, some empirical studies examining the change from a 
single-class to a dual-class structure suggest that such a change 
might also have positive effects. Valentin Dimitrov and Prem Jain 
studied a sample of 178 firms that changed from a one-share-one-
vote structure to a dual-class structure between 1979 and 1998, and 
found that dual-class recapitalizations are shareholder value-
enhancing corporate initiatives.77 Scott Bauguess, Myron Slovin 
and Marie Sushka used a sample of 142 firms that changed from a 
single-class to a dual-class structure from 1978 through 1998, and 
found that performance improves for the firms where insiders sell 
a sizeable amount of their economic interests while maintaining 
voting control.78 
Changes in a firm’s valuation over its lifecycle may explain 
some of the mixed results regarding the effects of dual-class 
structures. Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel argue that dual-class 
structures become value-decreasing over time because any 
potential benefits of these structures decline after the IPO, while the 
associated agency costs increase.79 Indeed, Martijn Cremers, Beni 
Lauterbach and Anete Pajuste found that the relative valuation of 
 
 75. Scott B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. Zutter, What’s in a Vote? The 
Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm Values, 45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 94, 
112–13 (2008). 
 76. Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Long-Term Valuation Effects of Voluntary Dual 
Class Share Unifications, 31 J. CORP. FIN. 171 (2015). 
 77. Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into 
Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342, 346–47 (2006). 
 78. Scott W. Bauguess, Myron B. Slovin & Marie E. Sushka, Large Shareholder 
Diversification, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Benefits of Changing to Differential Voting Rights, 
36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1244, 1244–45 (2012). 
 79. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42 (suggesting that dual-class structures would 
sunset after a fixed period of time subsequent to the IPO unless their extension were 
approved by shareholders unaffiliated with the controller). 
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dual- versus single-class firms depends on the firm’s lifecycle.80 
They documented that while at the time of the IPO dual-class firms 
tend to have a higher market valuation than their matched single-
class firms, the valuation premium declines over time and becomes 
on average negative about six years after the IPO. Hyunseob Kim 
and Roni Michaely observed that relative to single-class firms, 
dual-class firms experience a ten percent larger decline in valuation 
as they mature.81 Moreover, firms that switch from dual- to single-
class structures exhibit a Tobin’s q that is 0.55 higher than average 
dual-class firms, with similar characteristics, five years and more 
following their IPOs. Finally, Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst and Tony 
Via found that multi-class structures correlate with more 
innovation and value creation in the five-year period following the 
IPO, but from the sixth year onwards a strong deterioration occurs 
in the innovation and value-enhancing properties of a dual-class 
firm.82 These findings suggest that any potential benefits of dual-
class structures decline after the IPO, while the associated agency 
costs at the time of the IPO increase over time. 
V. NONVOTING V. LOW-VOTING STOCK 
There are two ways to structure a dual-class firm: with low-
voting or nonvoting common stock. This Part turns to focusing on 
the more unique type of dual-class structure in which the public 
shares have no voting rights at all. It notes that this structure is 
fundamentally different from the regular dual-class structures 
because the absence of even a highly diluted vote means that the 
firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure rules and 
corporate governance standards. Since disclosure and corporate 
governance are important to investor protection, from the 
investors’ perspective there are significant differences between 
issuing nonvoting and low-voting common stock. The next two 
sections will discuss these differences. 
 
 80. Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 54. 
 81. Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits 
of Dual-Class Voting (European Corp. Governance Inst. – Fin., Working Paper No. 590, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3145209. 
 82. Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst & M. Tony Via, Dual Class Share Structure and 
Innovation (Dec. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183517. 
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Corporate disclosure is crucial to the functioning of a market 
economy. Disclosure reduces the information asymmetry between 
corporate insiders and current and potential investors and 
creditors. A rich information environment and low information 
asymmetry facilitate the efficient allocation of resources and 
contribute to market liquidity and capital market development. 
Some of the disclosure requirements of public companies are 
linked to registered stock with voting rights. Therefore, issuing 
shares with no voting rights at all raises the concern of a decrease 
in the level of transparency of public companies. Without  
allocating voting rights to its public investors, a dual-class firm  
can evade the obligation to issue proxy statements and other 
disclosure requirements. 
Federal securities law requires public companies to distribute 
proxy or information statements prior to soliciting votes from their 
shareholders.83 If a company has registered only nonvoting shares, 
however, it is not required to distribute a proxy or information 
statement.84 Snap, for example, has three classes of common stock: 
Class A shares, Class B shares, and Class C shares.85 Since Class A 
is the only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and is nonvoting, Snap acknowledges that it 
is not required to file proxy statements under Section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act unless a vote of the Class A holders is 
required by applicable law.86 
However, stock exchange rules may require that any proxy 
statement sent to voting stockholders also be sent to nonvoting 
stockholders. Indeed, the NYSE requires that “holders of any listed 
non-voting common stock must receive all communications, 
including proxy material, sent generally to the holders of the voting 
securities of the listed company.”87 Therefore, Snap has indicated 
 
 83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (governing the solicitation of proxies in respect of 
registered securities). 
 84. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (2008) (requiring the distribution of an  
information statement to every shareholder “of the class that is entitled to vote” on a 
shareholder meeting). 
 85. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 86. Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 5, 40. 
 87. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(B)(2). 
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in its SEC filings that it intends to afford Class A holders the same 
degree of transparency as holders of shares with voting rights. The 
company promises in its prospectus that “we will provide holders 
of our Class A common stock, at the same time, any information 
that we provide generally to the holders of our Class B common 
stock and Class C common stock, including proxy statements, 
information statements, annual reports, and other information and 
reports.”88 However, this promise is limited in some important 
respects. First, if the company does not deliver any proxy 
statements to the holders of its Class B shares and Class C shares, 
then it similarly will not provide any proxy statements to the 
holders of its Class A shares.89 Second, because Snap is not required 
to file proxy statements under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange 
Act, it acknowledges that any proxy statement delivered may not 
include all the information under Section 14 that a public company 
with voting securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act would be required to provide to its shareholders.90 
Even though Snap is not bound by the proxy filing 
requirements of federal law, it is still obligated to comply with the 
ongoing periodic and current disclosure requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act. For example, as a public company it must 
report certain material corporate events on a current basis by filing 
a Form 8-K.91 Although a Form 8-K would include material 
information regarding a corporate event, it is less detailed and 
more open-ended in terms of content requirements than a proxy 
statement. This means that Snap’s disclosure on a Form 8-K may 
include significantly less information than would otherwise be 
required in a proxy statement of a public company with voting 
shares. Similarly, annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly 
reports on Form 10-Q do not include all the information required 
under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act.92 For example, if 
Snap takes any action in an extraordinary meeting of stockholders 
 
 88. Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 5. 
 89. Id. at 5, 40. 
 90. Id. at 5–6, 40. 
 91. Form 8-K is used for current reports under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, filed pursuant to Rule 13a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2016), or Rule 
15d-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2016). 
 92. Form 10-K and Form 10-Q are used for annual and quarterly reports, respectively, 
under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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where the holders of Class A common stock are not entitled to vote, 
it will not be required to file a preliminary proxy statement under 
Section 14. Since Form 10-K and Form 10-Q do not include the 
information required under Section 14 with respect to 
extraordinary meetings of stockholders, holders of Class A 
common stock may not receive that information.93 To sum up, 
although Snap is obligated to disclose information on a current and 
ongoing basis as a public company, Form 8-K, Form 10-K and Form 
10-Q do not provide investors with the same level of transparency 
and disclosure as proxy statements. 
Issuing nonvoting shares further reduces market transparency 
due to other disclosure requirements that are linked to shares with 
voting rights, such as beneficial ownership reporting rules. When a 
person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership of more 
than five percent of a voting class of a company’s equity securities 
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, they are 
required to file a Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G with the SEC.94 As 
noted under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, the term 
“equity securities” does not include securities of a class of 
nonvoting securities.95 Since Snap’s Class A common stock is the 
only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act and is nonvoting, beneficial owners of more than five 
percent of Snap’s common stock are not required to disclose their 
ownership on a Schedule 13D or 13G.96 As a result, there is less 
transparency in the marketplace regarding the company’s 
significant stockholders and their intentions. 
Finally, the short-swing profit rule under Section 16(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act requires a company’s insiders to return 
any profit made from the purchase and sale of the company’s stock 
 
 93. See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 6, 40. 
 94. Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G are filed with the SEC under Rule 13d, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d (2010), and are provided to the company that issued the securities and each 
exchange where the security is traded. 
 95. 17 C. F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (2010); see also Gulf United, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 
13078 (Apr. 28, 1979) (“[A]ll non-voting securities have been removed from the definition of 
an equity security stated in Rule 13d-1(d) . . . .”). 
 96. Snap stated in its prospectus that “[b]ecause our Class A common stock is non-
voting, significant holders of our common stock are exempt from the obligation to file reports 
under Sections 13(d), 13(g), and 16 of the Exchange Act.” See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, 
at 40. 
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if both transactions occur within a six-month period.97 Its purpose 
is to prevent insiders, who have greater access to a company’s 
material information, from taking advantage of the information to 
make short-term profits. To implement this rule, officers, directors, 
or significant stockholders—that is, holders of more than ten 
percent of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 
12—are required to file reports with respect to their purchases and 
sales of securities.98 Again, since Snap’s Class A nonvoting common 
stock is the only class of stock registered under Section 12, 
significant stockholders, other than directors and officers, are 
exempt from the short-swing profit rule.99 As a result, stockholders 
will be unable to bring derivative claims for disgorgement of profits 
for trades by significant stockholders under Section 16(b) unless the 
significant stockholders are also directors or officers. 
The above examples prove that issuing shares with no voting 
rights at all decreases the level of transparency in the capital 
markets. Furthermore, because private enforcement depends on 
the flow and quality of information provided to investors, less 
disclosure makes private enforcement less effective. 
B. Corporate Governance 
Voting rights are a “foundational component of sound 
corporate governance.”100 Therefore, in addition to adversely 
affecting disclosure requirements, issuing nonvoting, rather  
than low-voting, common stock adversely affects corporate 
governance as well. Holders of nonvoting stock are deprived of 
important governance mechanisms. These mechanisms will be 
discussed below. 
First, unlike holders of low-voting stock, holders of nonvoting 
stock cannot vote on significant issues at a shareholder meeting.101 
For example, they are not allowed to elect directors to the board or 
 
 97. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 896; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
 98. See 17 C.F.R § 240.16a. 
 99. See Snap Prospectus, supra note 34, at 40. 
 100. See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, Remarks at the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee 
Meeting (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/stein-statement-
investor-advisory-committee-meeting-030917. 
 101. See Steven M. Haas & Charles Brewer, What’s the Deal with Nonvoting Shares? An 
Overview of the Legal Differences Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, INSIGHTS, Oct. 2017, at  8. 
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remove them from office.102 Moreover, they cannot approve 
extraordinary transactions of the company,103 such as mergers,104 
significant asset sales,105 or dissolution.106 Finally, they are not able 
to make amendments to the company’s certificate of 
incorporation.107 Furthermore, according to the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the majority of 
publicly traded companies are required to offer shareholders an 
advisory (but nonbinding) vote on executive compensation, known 
as a “say-on-pay” vote.108 When shareholders have no voting  
rights at all, however, they are denied any opportunity to cast say-
on-pay votes.109 
Second, holders of nonvoting stock are deprived of certain 
notice rights under Delaware corporate law. In contrast to low-
voting shareholders, nonvoting shareholders are not entitled to 
receive a written notice of a shareholder meeting in which they are 
not entitled to vote,110 unless the meeting is being held to vote on a 
merger or consolidation111 or to ratify a defective corporate act.112 
 
 102. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216(3) (2019). 
 103. However, under Delaware corporate law, holders of nonvoting stock are entitled 
to vote on the conversion of a domestic corporation into other entities and the transfer, 
domestication, or continuance of domestic corporations. See id. §§ 266(b), 390(b). 
 104. See, e.g., id. § 251(c). 
 105. See, e.g., id. § 271(a). 
 106. See, e.g., id. § 275(b). 
 107. See, e.g., id. § 242(b)(1). However, holders of a class of nonvoting shares are entitled 
to vote as a class on a proposed amendment: 
if the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate number of authorized 
shares of such class, increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such class, 
or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such 
class so as to affect them adversely. 
Id. § 242(b)(2). 
 108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111- 
203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). Section 951 amended the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 by adding Section 14A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1). 
 109. For more examples of significant corporate issues that holders of nonvoting stock 
cannot vote on at shareholder meetings, see Haas & Brewer, supra note 101. But see Dorothy 
S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 687 (2019) 
(arguing that some shareholders are weakly motivated voters who do not value voting rights 
at a shareholder meeting and thus prefer purchasing discounted nonvoting stock). 
 110. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(b) (2019) (requiring that each shareholder entitled 
to vote at the meeting receive written notice of a shareholder meeting). 
 111. See id. § 251(c). 
 112. See id. § 204(d). Nonvoting shareholders are also entitled to receive a written notice 
if the board of directors ratifies a defective corporate act that does not require shareholder 
approval or if shareholders ratify a defective act by written consent. See id. § 204(g). 
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Moreover, holders of nonvoting shares are not entitled to receive a 
notice that a corporate action has been taken by written consent in 
lieu of a shareholder meeting.113 
Third, nonvoting shareholders cannot express their voice on a 
company’s key issues. In order to be eligible to submit a proposal 
for inclusion in a proxy statement, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 requires a shareholder to hold “at least $2,000 
in market value, or one percent, of the company’s securities entitled to 
be voted on the proposal at the meeting.”114 Holders of nonvoting 
common stock, therefore, are unable to raise shareholder proposals 
under Rule 14a-8. 
Furthermore, the absence of even a highly diluted shareholder 
vote raises an interesting question about the implementation of 
state corporate law mechanisms for cleansing conflict-of-interest 
transactions.115 A recent Delaware case strengthened the power of 
minority shareholder voting in going-private mergers.116 In the 
M&F Worldwide (MFW) decision,117 the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that freeze-out mergers structured with a dual procedure of 
shareholder protections,118 which require approval of the majority 
of the minority shareholders, should be reviewed under the highly 
deferential business judgment standard instead of the highest level 
of scrutiny—the entire fairness review.119 In later cases, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery extended the application of the 
analytical framework articulated in MFW to govern not only going-
private mergers, but also other forms of controlling transactions.120 
 
 113. See id. § 228(e). 
 114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 115. Given the concentrated ownership structure of dual-class firms, the possibility of 
conflict-of-interest transactions is more significant than in widely held companies. See James 
Moloney et al., Non-Voting Shares and Judicial Scrutiny, INSIGHTS, May 2017, at 10, 12. 
 116. In a going-private merger, a corporation’s controlling shareholder attempts to buy 
the remainder of the corporation’s widely held shares from minority shareholders using the 
mechanism of a “statutory merger.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a)–(c) (2019). 
 117. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
 118. This dual procedure of shareholder protections is a negotiation of the terms of the 
freeze-out merger by a well-functioning special committee of independent directors and 
approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority shareholders. 
 119. Kahn, 88 A.3d at 635, 644. 
 120. See IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, C.A. No. 12742-CB (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 
2017); In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11202-VCS 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017); In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 
9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016). 
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Therefore, the desire to mitigate the judicial standard of review 
provides a strong incentive to get controlling transactions 
approved by a fully informed majority-of-the-minority vote.121 It 
might seem that the MFW procedure would not be available when 
minority shareholders have no voting rights, but that does not seem 
to be the case. A controlling shareholder who wished to rely on the 
MFW procedure to mitigate the standard of review could condition 
the transaction on the approval of a majority of the holders of 
(nonvoting) common stock, even if those shareholders were not 
generally entitled to vote.  
This section shows that holders of nonvoting common stock are 
deprived of important governance mechanisms. After identifying 
the serious consequences of issuing shares with no voting rights for 
disclosure and corporate governance, the next Part will suggest 
addressing them through SEC regulation and stock exchange rules. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Need for Regulatory Intervention 
The discussion so far has analyzed the agency costs of dual-
class structures and the serious consequences of nonvoting 
common stock for disclosure and corporate governance. In light of 
this analysis, the important question is whether nonvoting shares 
justify regulatory intervention to protect their holders. Some may 
argue that to the extent that the negative effects of nonvoting stock 
on investors can be assessed in advance, the stock price should 
reflect the decline in investor protection and thus would 
compensate nonvoting stockholders.122 If investors can freely 
choose whether to buy nonvoting shares that are accurately  
priced by the market, there is no apparent need for external 
regulatory intervention. 
However, there are several reasons for questioning this 
argument. First, it is doubtful that the IPO markets reflect the high 
 
 121. See also the decision in this case at the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re MFW 
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 122. Even if fewer than all investors can assess the effects of nonvoting stock on 
investor protection, insofar as a sufficient number of sophisticated investors are able to do 
so, the effects will be reflected in stock prices and compensate all of the nonvoting 
stockholders. See Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class 
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 123–25 (1987). 
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degree of efficiency that this argument demands.123 Second, not all 
investors are able to protect themselves from the negative 
implications of nonvoting stock for disclosure and corporate 
governance. This argument is especially important given the 
substantial share of passive investors in the capital markets. 
Passively managed funds have significantly increased their 
ownership share of the U.S. stock market in recent years.124 
Moreover, a large proportion of all mutual funds and exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) are index-tracking funds. Essentially, index 
funds buy and hold stock in an underlying index, such as the S&P 
500, and consequently own certain shares irrespective of their 
performance and prospects. As opposed to actively managed 
funds, they are unable to exercise the “Wall Street Walk”125 and to 
simply sell their shares if they are dissatisfied. Therefore, passive 
investors are forced to invest in nonvoting common shares despite 
their effects regarding eroding investor protection. 
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) has approached 
major index providers to explore the exclusion of share classes with 
no voting rights from core indices.126 Indeed, global index 
providers have recently initiated market consultations to determine 
whether to revise their policies regarding multiclass shares in 
general, nonvoting shares in particular. Following its consultation, 
S&P Dow Jones announced that, effective immediately, companies 
 
 123. See Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against 
Corporate Royalty, Speech at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law  
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-
against-corporate-royalty. For the general argument that capital markets do not usually price 
each and every corporate provision, see Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, 
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55–70 (John W. Pratt & Richard 
J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410–14 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411–27 (1985). 
 124. See Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 
112 (2016) (showing that the share of equity mutual fund assets held in passively managed 
funds tripled over the 1998–2014 period to 33.5%, and the share of total U.S. market 
capitalization held by passively managed funds quadrupled to more than 8%). 
 125. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 35 (1995) (explaining the “Wall Street Walk” 
as the “ability to sell out at any time”); see also Solomon, supra note 47, at 755–56. 
 126. See Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Unequal Voting Rights 
in Common Stock, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/bertsch-remarks-iac-
030917.pdf. 
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with multiple share classes would no longer be eligible for 
inclusion in the indices comprising the S&P Composite 1500, 
including the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600.127 
However, to minimize turnover, the change would not affect 
existing S&P Composite 1500 index constituents, who would  
be grandfathered.128 
According to FTSE Russell, its market consultation indicated 
broad support for the imposition of a minimum hurdle for the 
percentage of voting rights in public hands.129 Therefore, it 
proposed that more than five percent of a company’s voting rights 
be required to be held by non-restricted (“free float”) shareholders, 
as defined by FTSE Russell, in order to be eligible for inclusion in 
all FTSE Russell indices.130 The policy would apply to new index 
constituents from the September 2017 quarterly and semiannual 
index reviews.131 An indicative analysis performed by FTSE Russell 
has shown that thirty-seven current index companies would not 
meet the five percent hurdle.132 Under FTSE Russell’s 
grandfathering rule, these companies would have five years to 
change their capital structure (e.g., increase the voting power of 
their free float or reduce the voting power of their high-voting 
stock) to avoid expulsion from the index.133 
FTSE Russell’s decision not to include in its indices companies 
that offer only nonvoting common stock, but to require a minimum 
threshold for voting rights, is consistent with the thesis of this 
 
 127. See S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules, 
S&P DOW JONES INDICES (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-
assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannoun
cement7.31.17.pdf?force_download=true. S&P Dow Jones also announced that the S&P 
Global BMI Indices, S&P Total Market Index, and other S&P and Dow Jones-branded indices 
would not be affected by this change. Id. 
 128. Id. A newly public company spun off from a current S&P Composite 1500 index 
constituent would not need to meet the criteria for new additions to the index, and so would 
effectively benefit from its parent’s grandfathering. See Joseph A. Hall & Michael Kaplan, 
Snap Decision: Leading Index Providers Nix Multi-Class Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/02/ 
snap-decision-leading-index-providers-nix-multi-class-shares/#more-100537. 
 129. See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION RESULTS 2 (2017), 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_ 
Results.pdf. 
 130. See FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL, supra note 10. 
 131. Id. at 6. 
 132. See Hall & Kaplan, supra note 128. 
 133. See FTSE RUSSELL PROPOSAL, supra note 10. 
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Article. The above analysis has shown that shareholder low-voting 
rights are important to investor protection, even though they are 
disproportionately much lower than the high-voting rights of the 
insiders. In the absence of even a highly diluted vote in public 
hands, the firm does not have to abide by certain types of disclosure 
rules and corporate governance standards.134 It seems that the 
importance of voting rights has led FTSE Russell to impose a 
minimum hurdle for the percentage of voting rights in public 
hands. This new policy of index eligibility may 
disincentivize companies from offering only nonvoting shares to 
the public.135 
However, these decisions by the S&P Dow Jones and the FTSE 
Russell have far-reaching implications that cannot be ignored. The 
exclusion of the stock of some of the most-innovative companies 
would prevent the indices from being as expansive and diverse as 
the underlying industries and economies whose performance they 
seek to capture.136 The indices then may no longer reflect the 
investable universe of public companies or represent the  
wealth-creating power of the U.S. economy.137 As a result, the 
access to the investment marketplace of Main Street investors, who 
often own stock in U.S. public companies through an index, would 
become limited.138 
This Article suggests different ways to address the 
consequences of nonvoting common stock for disclosure and 
 
 134. See supra Part V. 
 135. Research has consistently established that inclusion of a company’s stock in a 
major index increases (and exclusion decreases) the liquidity and value of that stock. See, e.g., 
Messod D. Beneish & Robert E. Whaley, An Anatomy of the “S&P Game”: The Effects of 
Changing the Rules, 51 J. FIN. 1909 (1996); Yen-Cheng Chang, Harrison Hong & Inessa 
Liskovich, Regression Discontinuity and the Price Effects of Stock Market Indexing, 28 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 212 (2015); Lawrence Harris & Eitan Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with 
Changes in the S&P 500 List: New Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. FIN. 815 
(1986); Anthony W. Lynch & Richard R. Mendenhall, New Evidence on Stock Price Effects 
Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 Index, 70 J. BUS. 351 (1997); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand 
Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). 
 136. See A Potential Solution for Voting Rights and Index Inclusion Issues, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-a-potential-solution-
for-voting-rights-and-index-inclusion-issues-october2017.pdf (last visited Oct.. 11, 2019). 
 137. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The S&P and FTSE Russell Should Reverse Course on 
 Dual Class Shares, OXFORD L. FAC.: BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac. 
uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/11/sp-and-ftse-russell-should-reverse-course-dual-
class-shares. 
 138. See Jackson, supra note 123. 
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corporate governance, which are not limited to the indices’ 
inclusion policy, but reflect a broader perspective of the issue. 
Instead of addressing these consequences incidentally by means of 
the index providers and thus creating a gap between the indices 
and the economy, the Article suggests addressing them directly 
through SEC regulation and stock exchange rules.139 These 
proposals will be discussed in the next two sections. 
B. SEC Regulation 
Protecting investors is one of the three key statutory mandates 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.140 To achieve this 
goal, the SEC set disclosure requirements for public companies 
designed to ensure transparency. The SEC’s disclosure regime 
relies on fully informed investors to hold boards and management 
accountable through the exercise of the shareholder franchise. 
The above analysis has shown, however, that issuing public 
shares with no voting rights at all has negative effects on investor 
protection.141 This is because some of the disclosure requirements 
of public companies are linked to public shares with voting rights. 
To protect nonvoting shareholders, therefore, the SEC should 
revisit the linkage between voting rights and disclosure, requiring 
the same level of disclosure for the issuance of both voting and 
nonvoting stock. 
Some may question the SEC’s authority to regulate shareholder 
voting rights, which traditionally have been the exclusive province 
of state corporate law. Indeed, in 1990 a federal court discussed this 
issue while examining Rule 19c-4 of the SEC.142 This rule barred 
national securities exchanges from listing the stock of any issuer 
that took any action with “the effect of nullifying, restricting, or 
disparately reducing the per share voting rights” of existing 
 
 139. See Matt Levine, Listing Standards and Dividend Shares, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Apr. 13, 
2017, 9:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-13/listing-standards-
and-dividend-shares (arguing that excluding companies on the basis of governance 
characteristics is a “weird role” for stock indices, as opposed to the “long tradition of 
corporate governance standards being imposed by stock exchanges, as ‘listing standards,’ a 
sort of seal of approval that listed companies have been screened by the exchange and found 
to be plausible investments”). 
 140. The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). 
 141. See supra Section V.A. 
 142. See Voting Rights Listing Standards, supra note 21. 
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common stock shareholders of the company.143 In its Business 
Roundtable decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
struck down the rule as being beyond the SEC’s delegated 
authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court 
found that “the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include 
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of 
disclosure . . . and that is concededly a part of corporate 
governance traditionally left to the states.”144 
It should be noted that the SEC based its authority to adopt Rule 
19c-4 on its powers under Section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange 
Act,145 which permits it to amend exchange rules provided that the 
Commission’s action furthers the purposes of the Act. The D.C. 
Circuit determined, however, that the attempt to regulate corporate 
voting rights furthered none of the Securities Exchange Act’s 
purposes. In striking down Rule 19c-4, the court adopted a narrow 
view of the Act’s purposes. According to the court, the primary 
purpose of the federal proxy regulation under Section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act is disclosure.146 
However, even under this narrow view of the Securities 
Exchange Act, it plainly delegates authority to the SEC to regulate 
nonvoting common stock. There is a significant difference between 
issuing shares with inferior voting rights—as was in the case of the 
Business Roundtable decision—and issuing shares with no voting 
rights at all. Issuing nonvoting shares is not just a matter of 
allocation of powers among classes of shareholders, which may be 
governed by state corporate law. In contrast, it has direct negative 
implications for disclosure and investor protection, which are 
subject to the SEC’s delegated authority under the Securities 
Exchange Act: The Commission has a statutory mandate to protect 
investors, and therefore it should act to protect holders of 
nonvoting common stock by expanding disclosure requirements. 
The linkage between voting rights and disclosure requirements 
should be severed in order to ensure the same high degree of 
information and transparency when nonvoting stock is issued as is 
required when voting stock is issued. For example, since annual 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2012). 
 146. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410–11. 
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reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q do not 
include all the information included in proxy statements and 
required under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
nonvoting shareholders are provided with lower level of  
disclosure and transparency than voting shareholders.147 The SEC 
should consider adding disclosure requirements to Form 10-K  
and Form 10-Q that would provide nonvoting shareholders  
with all information equivalent to that ordinarily included in  
proxy statements.148 
C. Stock Exchange Rules 
Important goals of stock exchange rules are to ensure the 
quality of the markets and protect investors.149 To fulfill these goals, 
stock exchanges promulgate rules for listed firms governing 
financial disclosure, annual meetings, or corporate structure. The 
exchange rules should impose requirements for listed firms aimed 
at protecting holders of nonvoting stock by expanding their 
disclosure and governance rights. 
A possible challenge to imposing strict requirements for listed 
firms is that the competition to attract new listings may put “race 
to the bottom” pressure on listing standards. This pressure may 
lead stock exchanges to adopt pro-management and anti-
shareholder rules. Since corporate managers decide whether and 
where to list, they may base their decision on which exchange  
offers them the greatest opportunity to benefit at the expense of 
investors. If one exchange relaxes its rules and allows managers to 
exploit investors, other exchanges may be forced to follow suit to 
avoid losing their listings to the first exchange. The competition 
among stock exchanges will result in a “race to the bottom” in 
 
 147. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Recommendation of the Investor as Owner Subcommittee: Dual Class and 
Other Entrenching Governance Structures in Public Companies, SEC (Feb. 27, 2018) at 7, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac030818-investor-as-
owner-subcommittee-recommendation.pdf. 
 149. See, e.g., Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5101 (“Nasdaq is entrusted with the 
authority to preserve and strengthen the quality of and public confidence in its market.”). 
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which all exchanges end up with similar lax rules to the detriment 
of investors.150 
However, stock exchanges have strong incentives to maintain 
good reputations.151 The long-run profitability of an exchange is 
highly dependent on trading volume, which will fall if investors 
doubt its integrity. The listing rules chosen by a particular exchange 
are a matter of public record, and thus observable by investors. If 
the rules allowed by an exchange were to produce systematic 
exploitation of investors, investors would lose confidence in the 
exchange, and the exchange would lose trading volume as 
investors took their business elsewhere. It is clearly in the interest 
of exchanges, therefore, to adopt listing rules that protect investors. 
Moreover, maintaining a good reputation is most important when 
repeat transactions are contemplated. Repeat business is essential 
to the success of a stock exchange, and thus the costs of losing it 
through damage to reputation are high. Therefore, the “race to the 
bottom” argument loses some of its merit. 
The listing standards adopted by the main stock exchanges 
following the Business Roundtable decision152 in 1990 may illustrate 
the incentives of the exchanges to maintain good reputations in the 
present context. Even though the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals overturned Rule 19c-4 of the SEC,153 both the NYSE and 
the Nasdaq voluntarily decided to adopt a policy similar to this rule 
in their listing standards.154 
Indeed, stock exchange rules grant nonvoting shareholders of 
listed companies governance rights they do not otherwise have 
under state law. For example, under Delaware corporate law no 
annual shareholder meeting is required if the directors are elected 
 
 150. The “race to the bottom” argument was developed in connection to the 
consequences of the competition among states to attract incorporations. See, e.g., Barry D. 
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 
179 (1985); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L. J. 663 (1974); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 151. Fischel, supra note 122, at 124. 
 152. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(A) & (B); Nasdaq 
Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5640. 
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by unanimous written consent.155 Therefore, companies may be 
able to avoid holding annual meetings by issuing nonvoting 
common stock to the public and concentrating all of the voting 
rights in the hands of insiders, who elect directors by unanimous 
written consent. However, stock exchange rules strengthen 
nonvoting shareholders’ rights by requiring companies to hold an 
annual shareholder meeting even if the only listed shares are 
nonvoting common stock.156  
Moreover, the NYSE rules also grant nonvoting shareholders of 
listed companies certain disclosure rights they do not otherwise 
have under federal law. These rules are aimed at ensuring holders 
of nonvoting common stock the same degree of transparency as 
holders of voting common stock. Therefore, they require that any 
materials sent to voting shareholders, including proxy material, 
also be sent to nonvoting shareholders.157  
Although current stock exchange rules already grant nonvoting 
shareholders certain disclosure and governance rights they do not 
otherwise have under federal or state law, these rules are limited 
and far from addressing all the serious consequences of nonvoting 
common stock for investor protection analyzed in Part V. For 
example, a company that has registered only nonvoting securities 
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may evade 
the NYSE requirement to send nonvoting shareholders all proxy 
statements sent to voting shareholders—it would  just not provide 
any proxy statements to voting shareholders in the first place.158 
Moreover, even if the company voluntarily provides proxy 
 
 155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2019). 
 156. See NASDAQ, Frequently Asked Questions, No. 82, https://listingcenter.nasdaq. 
com/Material_Search.aspx?cid=1,22,45,52,108,71,69&mcd=LQ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019) 
(“A company that lists only non-voting common stock on Nasdaq is required to hold an 
annual meeting.”); see also Nasdaq Listing Rules, supra note 24, § 5620(a) (“Each Company 
listing common stock or voting preferred stock, and their equivalents, shall hold an annual 
meeting of Shareholders no later than one year after the end of the Company’s fiscal year-
end . . . .”); NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 302.00 (“Listed companies are 
required to hold an annual shareholders’ meeting during each fiscal year.”). 
 157. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 313.00(B)(2) (“[H]olders of any 
listed non-voting common stock must receive all communications, including proxy material, 
sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of the listed company.”). 
 158. When voting securities are not registered under Section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act, the company is not required to distribute proxy statements under federal 
securities law. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (governing the solicitation of proxies in respect of 
registered securities). 
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statements for its shareholders, it may not include all the 
information under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act that a 
company with voting securities registered under Section 12 would 
be required to provide to its shareholders. Therefore, this Article 
calls for expanding disclosure rights of nonvoting shareholders. 
Stock exchange rules should impose a broader requirement for 
delivering proxy statements to holders of nonvoting shares 
registered under Section 12 regardless of sending them to voting 
shareholders. In addition, they should require that any proxy 
statements sent to nonvoting shareholders include all the 
information under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act that a 
company with voting securities registered under Section 12 would 
be required to provide to its shareholders.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
A dual-class capital structure enables founders to entrench their 
control of the company even after it goes public. The debate over 
the pros and cons of this structure divides continents and legal 
systems.159 On the one hand, supporters argue that it allows the 
company’s founders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision for 
producing above-market returns and insulates management from 
short-term market pressures. On the other hand, opponents argue 
that the combination of founders’ weak ownership incentives and 
entrenchment results in agency problems that may lead to a 
distortion of various business choices, such as the extraction of 
private benefits of control. The analysis in this Article has shown, 
however, that regardless of one’s position on dual-class structures 
in general, having at least some voting rights in public hands is 
important for investor protection. So long as shareholders have 
even inferior voting rights, they are protected by important 
disclosure and governance requirements for listed firms. 
Nonvoting shareholders, however, are deprived of these significant 
components of investor protection. Therefore, it should be plainly 
apparent, even to advocates of multiple classes of common stock 
with unequal voting rights, that it is necessary to expand the 
disclosure and governance rights of nonvoting shareholders. 
 
 159. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 42, at 599–601. 
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The Article suggests two ways to address the serious 
consequences of nonvoting common stock for investor protection. 
First, the SEC should act to protect nonvoting shareholders by 
requiring the same level of disclosure when nonvoting stock is 
issued as is required when voting stock is issued. Second, stock 
exchange rules should protect holders of nonvoting stock by 
granting them certain disclosure and governance rights they do not 
otherwise have under federal or state law. These proposals directly 
address the implications of nonvoting stock for disclosure and 
corporate governance, and therefore are preferable to the current 
incidental reaction of major index providers to Snap’s recent IPO. 
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